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Decision by Sampling: The Role of the Decision Environment in Risky
Choice
Neil Stewart
University of Warwick
Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that
we make. Here, I review the application of DbS to risky decision making. According to clas-
sical theories of risky decision making, people make stable transformations between outcomes
and probabilities and their subjective counterparts using fixed psychoeconomic functions. DbS
offers a quite different account. In DbS, the subjective value of an outcome or probability is
derived from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons with a sample of other outcomes or prob-
abilities from the decision environment. In this way, the distribution of attribute values in the
environment determines the subjective valuations of outcomes and probabilities. I show how
DbS interacts with the real-world distributions of gains, losses, and probabilities to produce the
classical psychoeconomic functions. I extend DbS to account for preferences in benchmark
data sets. Finally, in a challenge to the classical notion of stable subjective valuations, I review
evidence that manipulating the distribution of attribute values in the environment changes our
subjective valuations just as DbS predicts.
Risky decision making is a central part of human cogni-
tion. One often has to choose between alternative actions
where the outcomes associated with each action are uncer-
tain. Because our environment is not a deterministic place,
most everyday decisions involve some element of risk. And
many of our most important decisions also involve risk. For
example, financial decisions involving saving and borrowing
are risky because of variability in interest rates and the stock
market. Medical decisions are risky because the effective-
ness of treatments will vary from case to case.
In this review, I show how the risky decisions that we
make are influenced by the statistical distributions of risks
and rewards in the environment. Our sensitivity to the dis-
tribution of attributes within the environment emerges from
our use of a set of domain-general cognitive tools to make
risky decisions and is captured in the decision by sampling
model (DbS, Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006). I begin by re-
viewing what might be considered to be the most prominent
theory of risky decision making: prospect theory (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Prospect
theory provides an excellent description of human risky de-
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cision making. In the second part of the article, I show how
it is possible to derive the prospect-theory description from
the real-world distribution of risks and rewards under the as-
sumptions of the DbS model. In the penultimate part of this
article, I show how the DbS model has been successfully de-
veloped to provide a process account of the risky decisions
that we make. Finally, in a direct test of the DbS model, I
review new experimental evidence for the link between the
distribution of attribute values in the environment and the
risky decisions that we make.
Descriptive Models of Risky
Decision Making
If you were offered a choice between either (a) £1,000 or
(b) a 50% chance of £2,000 otherwise £0 which would you
choose? Questions like these have been used extensively in
the study of human risky decision making as carefully con-
trolled proxies for real-life risky decisions. Lo´pes and Oden
(1983), and later Kahneman (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000),
make the analogy between the study of choices between sim-
ple gambles in risky decision making and the study of the
fruit fly in genetics. Returning to the example, the majority
of people are risk averse and have a preference for the cer-
tain £1,000. This result is immediately useful in ruling out
perhaps the most obvious candidate—expected value—as a
model for human risky decision making.
In expected value theory, people prefer the option which
offers them the highest average payoff. For the first option,
the expected value is £1,000. For the second option, the ex-
pected values is also £1,000 = 1/2×£2,000+ 1/2×£0. The
two options have the same expected value and so expected
value does not capture the preference for the first option.
Economists have a theory that does capture this risk-
averse preference: expected utility (EU) theory (Bernoulli,
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Figure 1. A power law utility function U(x) = xα transforms
money x into its subjective equivalent U(x).
1738/1954; see von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947 for an
axiomatisation). In EU theory, money is transformed into
utility before expectations are taken. Figure 1 shows a typical
power-law utility function where U(x) = xα. (Bernoulli sug-
gested a logarithmic function, but credits Cramer, 1728, with
suggesting the square root function. For investigations into
functional forms for utility functions, see Bell & Fishburn,
1999; Daniels & Keller, 1992; Fishburn & Kochenberger,
1979.) The utility function has a concave-downward shape
(when α < 1 the function is curved downwards) and this al-
lows the model to capture the risk aversion displayed in the
preference for the certain £1,000. Specifically, because the
utility of £1,000 is more than half the utility of £2,000 when
the utility curve is concave, EU theory predicts a higher util-
ity for, and thus a preference for, the first option. Specifically,
U(£1,000) > 1/2×U(£2,000)+ 1/2×U(£0) when α < 1.
The concave shape of the utility function captures and ex-
plains risk aversion. But there is evidence that utility func-
tions have this concave-downward form when they are mea-
sured in risk free scenarios. For example, Galanter (1962)
found a concave shape by asking participants to judge how
much money would make them twice as happy as a refer-
ence amount. Other theories place risk aversion elsewhere
(see Davies & Satchell, 2007, for a recent discussion).
EU theory plays a foundational role in economics, be-
cause it is used as a model of the rational individual in
many models of the economy. Its mathematical simplicity
has given it great appeal. Unfortunately, although it captures
risk aversion, it is not a complete description of human risky
decision making. There are many examples of preference
patterns that violate EU theory (for reviews see Allais, 1953;
Birnbaum, 2008; Camerer, 1995; Luce, 2000; Schoemaker,
1982; Starmer, 2000). Committing a grave injustice to the
volume of empirical work demonstrating violations of EU
theory, I will present here only two examples taken from
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). First, consider the pair of
choices in Table 1. These choices are an example of the
common-ratio effect (Allais, 1953). Choice 1 offers either
(a) an 80% chance of £4,000 otherwise £0 or (b) £3,000.
80% of Kahneman and Tversky’s participants preferred the
sure £3,000. Choice 2 offers either (a) a 20% chance of
£4000 otherwise £0 or (b) a 25% chance of £3,000 otherwise
nothing. Now the majority of participants preferred the 20%
chance of £4,000.
The preference for Prospect B in Choice 1 but Prospect
A in Choice 2 represents a violation of EU theory be-
cause Choice 2 is generated from Choice 1 by multiplying
probabilities by 1/4. Because the same thing was done to
both prospects in the choice, preference should not switch
from one side to the other. More specifically, the prefer-
ence for Prospect B in Choice 1 implies .80×U(£4,000) <
1.00×U(£3,000) but the preference for Prospect A in Choice
2 implies .20×U(£4,000) > .25×U(£3,000). These two in-
equalities contradict one another and cannot both be true, and
thus this pattern of preference violates EU theory. Although
this violation is demonstrated at the population level, a large
proportion of individual participants show the preference for
Prospect B in Choice 1 and Prospect A in Choice 2 when
tested with both choices (e.g., Carlin, 1992).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory
to account for violations like the common-ratio effect. They
deliberately kept their formulation close to EU theory, and in-
corporated the minimum modifications necessary to account
for the data. The first key difference is the inclusion of a
probability-weighting function. The left panel of Figure 2
shows the decision weighting function from Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative prospect theory. Just as real
world outcomes are transformed into their subjective utility
equivalents by the utility function, Kahneman and Tversky
suggested that objective probabilities are transformed into
subjective probabilities. The probability-weighting function
is most sensitive (i.e., steepest) near 0 and 1 and is least sen-
sitive (i.e., flattest) for mid-range probabilities. 1
The probability-weighting function allows prospect the-
ory to account for the common-ratio effect. Specifically, the
difference between the weights of the .8 and 1.0 probabili-
ties in Choice 1 is large, because the probability-weighting
function is most sensitive in this region. But the difference
between the weights of the .2 and .25 probabilities in Choice
2 is small, because the probability-weighting function is less
sensitive in this region. Thus although the ratio of the ob-
jective probabilities is the same in Choices 1 and 2, the ratio
of the weights is not. As a result, relatively more weight is
placed on the £3,000 in Choice 1 but relatively more weight
is placed on the £4,000 in Choice 2. The reversal in pref-
erence between the two choices results from the shift in the
relative sizes of the decision weights.
1 In fact, Kahneman and Tversky maintained a difference be-
tween subjective probability and decision weighting. A subjective
probability is the psychophysical transform of the objective proba-
bility. A decision weight is the emphasis given to the correspond-
ing outcome. So one might have an accurately calibrated subjective
probability for an objectively unlikely event (e.g., knowing winning
the lottery is very unlikely), but still behave as if the event is more
likely than it really is because one weights the associated outcome
too heavily (e.g., by buying a ticket).
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Table 1
The Common-Ratio Effect
Prospect A Prospect B
Choice Amount Probability % chosen Amount Probability % chosen
1 £4,000 .8 20% £3,000 1.0 80%
£0 .2
2 £4,000 .2 65% £3,000 .25 35%
£0 .8 £0 .75
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Figure 2. A: Example probability-weighting function (top) and
value function (bottom) from cumulative prospect theory.
A second violation of EU theory is shown in Table 2.
Choice 1 pays participants an initial payment of £1,000. Par-
ticipants are then offered (a) a 50% chance of winning an-
other £1,000 otherwise £0 or (b) £500. 84% of participants
prefer Prospect B. Choice 2 pays participants an initial pay-
ment of £2,000. Participants are then offered (a) a 50%
chance of losing £1,000 or otherwise losing nothing or (b)
a sure loss of £500. 69% of participants prefer Prospect A.
The preference for Prospect B in Choice 1 but Prospect
A in Choice 2 represents a violation of EU theory because
Choices 1 and 2 lead to the same net outcomes. For both
choices, when initial endowments are integrated with the
prospect payoffs, Prospect A offers a 50% chance of £1,000
and a 50% chance of £2,000 and Prospect B offers £1,500
for sure. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) refer to this effect
as a framing effect, because whether outcomes were framed
as gains or losses switched people’s preferences from risk
averse to risk prone.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) incorporated this finding
into prospect theory by again making a small change to the
EU framework. The right panel in Figure 2 shows a re-
vised function for transforming amounts into their subjec-
tive equivalents. In prospect theory, this function is called
the value function (cf. the utility function in EU theory). In
the top-right quadrant, the function is concave, just like the
utility function from EU theory, to capture risk-averse be-
haviour in the domain of gains. In the bottom-left quadrant,
the function is convex to capture risk seeking behaviour in
the domain of losses. The function is also steeper for losses
than for gains to capture the fact that people do not like to
play zero expected value gambles involving gains and losses
(but see Ert & Erev, 2007). For example, most people do
not want to play a gamble that offers equal chances to gain
£1,000 and to lose £1,000.
Prospect theory provides a good description of the risky
decisions that people make. The shapes of the probability-
weighting function and the value function are chosen to pro-
vide this good description. In addition to prospect theory,
there are many other theories that have been derived from EU
theory including subjective EU theory (Edwards, 1962; Sav-
age, 1954), regret theory (Loomes & Sugden, 1982), rank-
dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1993), decision field the-
ory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), and the transfer-of-
attention-exchange model (Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997; Birn-
baum, 2008). What each of these theories has in common
is the assumption that outcomes and probabilities are trans-
formed into their subjective equivalents and expectations are
taken. The different theories assume different transforms of
amounts and probabilities, and these different transforms al-
low the models to describe the decision people make. In the
remainder of this article I want to consider DbS. According
to DbS, psychoeconomic functions have no psychological
status (i.e., we do not have look-up functions inside our heads
for converting between money and utility or probability and
subjective probability). Instead, psychoeconomic functions
are revealed from choice data: they describe the choices peo-
ple make, but not the psychology of choosing.
How the Distribution of Attribute
Values Shapes Revealed
Psychoeconomic Functions
DbS assumes that three simple cognitive tools are the ba-
sis for decision making: binary, ordinal comparison; sam-
pling; and frequency accumulation. Stewart et al. (2006)
review the evidence for the ubiquity of these domain-general
cognitive tools. Very briefly, the binary, ordinal comparison
tool is motivated by findings in psychophysics, where people
are rather good at saying which stimulus in a pair is the larger
stimulus, but are rather bad at estimating the magnitudes of
individual stimuli (Laming, 1997; Stewart, Brown, & Chater,
2005). The sampling tool is motivated by the judgement and
decision making literature, where hypotheses (in norm the-
ory, Kahneman & Miller, 1986) or uncertainties (in support
theory, Tversky & Koehler, 1994) are compared to a small
sample of exemplars from memory. More generally, that our
working memories can hold a small sample of information
from the immediate context and from long-term memory is
well established. The frequency accumulation tool is moti-
vated by the finding that we are rather good at keeping track
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Table 2
The Framing Effect
Prospect A Prospect B
Choice Amount Probability % chosen Amount Probability % chosen
1 Given £1,000 initially
£1,000 .5 16% £500 1.0 84%
£0 .5
2 Given £2,000 initially
-£1,000 .5 69% -£500 1.0 31%
£0 .5
of and manipulating frequencies (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hof-
frage, 1995; Sedlmeier & Betsch, 2002).
In DbS these three cognitive tools are used to derive the
subjective value of an attribute value (i.e., to derive the psy-
chological significance of a probability or of an outcome).
Specifically, the subjective value is constructed from a se-
ries of binary, ordinal comparisons within a set of attribute
values sampled both from the immediate context of the deci-
sion and from long-term memory. For each attribute value, a
frequency count is kept of the number of favourable compar-
isons. The subjective value of an attribute is given by the pro-
portion of favourable comparisons. For example, consider
how the subjective value of a gain of £12 might be arrived at.
The gain is compared to a small sample in working memory,
say £1, £5, £33, £45, and £82. The sample will come from
both the other attribute values in the immediate context and
from previous experiences stored in long-term memory. A
series of binary, ordinal comparisons are made between the
target attribute of £12 and the attributes in the sample. Of the
five possible comparisons, two of them are favourable (com-
parisons to £1 and £5). Thus the probability of a favourable
comparison is 2/5, and in DbS this probability is used as the
subjective value.
Of course, the subject value is completely dependent upon
the distribution of attribute values in memory. Stewart et al.
(2006) made the assumption that the distribution of attribute
values in long-term memory reflects the real-world distribu-
tion (cf. J. R. Anderson & Schooler, 1991). Stewart et al.
showed how the value and probability-weighting functions
seen in prospect theory can be derived from the distributions
of probabilities and amounts encountered in the environment,
and thus provided an independent motivation for the particu-
lar shapes of these psychoeconomic functions.
The top panel of Figure 3 shows the credits into current
accounts held by a large UK bank. The distribution is used
as a crude approximation to the distribution of gains people
encounter in the world. The figure is aggregated across many
current accounts and represents about 320,000 payments in
total. There are two key properties of this distribution. First,
the distribution is very roughly power-law (i.e., is roughly
linear on the log-log plot). Thus, although one might ques-
tion whether the distribution of credits into UK current ac-
counts is truly representative of the distribution of gains in an
individual person’s long-term memory, there is good reason
to expect the long-term memory distribution to have similar
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Figure 3. The frequency of credits to (top) and debits from (bot-
tom) a large sample of UK current accounts. Adapted from Stewart,
Chater, and Brown (2006).
properties. Power law distributions are very common (Bak,
1997) and describe the distributions of prices of many ev-
eryday items (e.g., Stewart et al., 2006; Stewart & Simpson,
2008). Second, and more importantly for the current argu-
ment, there are many more small credits than there are large
credits. Thus, when one is sampling gains from long-term
memory, one is more likely to sample small gains than large
gains.
The subjective value of a given target gain is determined
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by the proportion of gains in the sample to which a binary or-
dinal comparison is favourable. The proportion of a sample
less than a given value is, of course, the definition of the cu-
mulative probability density function. The top-right quadrant
of Figure 4 shows the subjective value function for gains (or
equivalently, the cumulative probability density function for
gains). The subject value function for gains is concave, just
like the utility function from EU theory and the value func-
tion for gains from prospect theory. But, in DbS, the concav-
ity is derived from the interaction of a simple set of cognitive
tools with the real-world distribution of attribute values. This
contrasts strongly with EU theory and with prospect theory
where the shape of the function is descriptive, that is, derived
to fit the choice data from gambling experiments.
Previous work has estimated the exponent for power-law
utility functions. Galanter (1962) has people estimate how
much money would make them twice as happy as a reference
amount. Assuming a power-law utility function, Galanter
estimated the power to be 0.43. Kornbrot, Donnelly, and
Galanter (1981) estimated the exponent using a signal de-
tection procedure. By varying the (small) payoffs for hits,
correct rejections, false alarms, and misses Kornbrot et al.
(1981) estimate an exponent of 0.48. Galanter (1990) re-
peated his earlier procedure and found an exponent of 0.54.
Galanter (1990) also reports an unpublished magnitude es-
timate experiment by Kornbrot which found an exponent of
0.43. Using the data in Figure 4, I estimate the exponent to
be 0.47, which agrees well with the earlier figures. 2
A given individual probably has only a sub-sample of the
set of amounts in Figure 3 is their memory and, further, prob-
ably only samples a sub-sample of the amounts in their mem-
ory. Stewart et al. (2006) show that, under conditions of ran-
dom sampling, Figure 4 actually represents the mean subject
value. A more realistic assumption about sampling is likely
to be necessary—sampling is surely not random—but, for
the arguments made so far, more detailed assumptions are
not necessary.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 and the bottom-left quadrant
of Figure 4 repeat the credits analysis for debits. The dis-
tribution of debits from UK current accounts is also power
law: There are more small debits than large debits. I have
plotted the subjective value function for debits in the bottom-
left quadrant of Figure 4. The function is reversed because
large debits are worse than small debits (whereas large gains
are better than small gains). Crucially, because there are
more small debits than large debits, the subjective value func-
tion for is convex for losses, just as it is in prospect theory.
Comparing credits and debits, there are more small debits
than small credits, so the value function for losses is initially
steeper than the value function for gains—just as in prospect
theory—and offers an account of loss aversion. In summary,
the DbS subjective value function is very similar to prospect
theory’s value function (see Figure 2). But in DbS the shape
of the value function is derived from the interaction of a sim-
ple set of cognitive tools with the real-world distribution of
gains and losses.
Stewart et al. (2006) repeated the credits and debits anal-
ysis for probabilities. People have a strong preference for
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Figure 4. The DbS subjective value function derived from the dis-
tribution of credits and debits in Figure 3. Adapted from Stewart,
Chater, and Brown (2006).
using words rather than numbers to express subjective prob-
abilities (see Budescu & Wallsten, 1995, for a review). Fig-
ure 5 shows the frequencies in natural language with which
different words are used to describe probabilities. Each line
represents a particular word or phrase (e.g., “a fair chance”).
The line’s location on the abscissa gives the mean numerical
probability the phrase is associated with, and the line’s height
represents the frequency in the British National Corpus.
The derivation of the subjective probability function is just
the same as the derivation of the value functions. Figure 6
shows the subjective probability function (i.e., the propor-
tion of verbal phrases describing events less likely than the
target phrase and, equivalently, the cumulative probability
density function). Because very unlikely probabilities (e.g.,
“impossible” and “never”) and very likely probabilities (e.g.,
“always” and “definitely”) are much more frequent than in-
termediate probabilities (e.g., “possible” and “fair chance”),
the derived subjective probability function is most sensitive
(i.e., steepest) at 0 and 1 and least sensitive (i.e., flattest)
with intermediate probabilities. This DbS subjective proba-
2 If data outside the range in Figure 4 are used, so that the DbS
subjective value function is extended to cover the full range of val-
ues in Figure 3, the best-fitting exponent drops to 0.11: Plotted in
log-log space, the subjective value function is initially linear with
slope 0.47, but then the slope reduces to zero above about £10,000,
so the subjective values of large amounts are all the same. This
breakdown, I think, reflects the limits of using these current account
data and assuming people randomly sample from them. For exam-
ple, when considering an annual salary or the price of a house peo-
ple are more likely to sample other similarly large amounts rather
than the costs of cups of coffee or weekly shops. Scale invariance in
the world and in memory (Chater & Brown, 2008) is likely to lead
to similar shaped utility functions across a range of magnitudes.
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Figure 6. The DbS probability-weighting function derived from
the distribution of probability phrases in the British National Cor-
pus in Figure 5. Adapted from Stewart, Chater, and Brown (2006).
bility function is very similar to cumulative prospect theory’s
weighting function (see Figure 2). But in DbS the shape of
the subjective probability function is derived from the inter-
action of a simple set of cognitive tools with the real-world
distribution probabilities, just as it was for gains and losses.
DbS might well be extended to situations of uncertainty
where the actual probabilities are not known (though I have
not yet formulated the details of this extension or tested it).
Because the construction of the subjective probability (or
weight) of an event relies only on binary, ordinal compar-
isons between events, weights might be constructed even if
one knows only which event is the more likely for pairs of
events—knowing the actual probabilities is not required.
In summary, in DbS, the subjective value of a given at-
tribute emerges from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons
with a sample from long-term memory. The subjective value
is given by the proportion of attribute values in the sample
that are less favourable. As a result, the psychoeconomic
functions are derived from the distribution of attribute values
in the real world. These functions are in close agreement
with the descriptive functions from prospect theory that de-
scribe people’s decisions so well. Stewart et al. (2006) also
apply DbS to temporal durations, and show how hyperbolic-
like temporal discounting emerges from the distribution of
delays that people encounter. More generally, in DbS all at-
tribute values are treated in exactly the same way. For exam-
ple, the DbS argument could be applied to give the subject
value of any type of attribute (e.g., ipod capacities, broad-
band speeds, calorific values, etc.). This is a pretty serious
departure from the normative consensus, where probabilities
are treated differently from amounts (specifically, probabili-
ties are used to weight amounts) but, as I’ll describe below,
the model provides a good description of the choices people
make despite this departure.
A Model of Choices
Thus far, I have described the DbS account of the valua-
tion of economic attributes: I’ve reviewed how the distribu-
tion of attribute values in the real world and the use of lim-
ited cognitive tools provides an independent motivation for
the psychoeconomic functions that describe the choices we
make so well. But of more interest is a model that actually
makes choice predictions. What is needed is a mechanism
for integrating information about risk and reward. For the
models derived from EU theory, this integration is described
by a multiplication. In DbS, mechanism for integration is
additive.
Though there is some evidence for multiplicative integra-
tion in providing valuations of single risky prospects, there
has been no comparison of different models of integration in
choice. When people are asked to provide certainty equiv-
alents, buying prices, and selling prices for gambles, their
ratings tend to show an interaction between probability and
amount information, indicating multiplicative information
integration (e.g., Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum, & Ordo´n˜ez,
1992; Tversky, 1969). But ratings of the attractiveness of
prospects tend to be additive (e.g., Levin, Johnson, Russo, &
Delden, 1985; Mellers & Chang, 1994; Mellers, Ordo´n˜ez, &
Birnbaum, 1992), integration of sample probabilities tends
to be additive (e.g., Shanteau, 1975), and integration of at-
tribute values tends to be additive for non-risky options (e.g.,
N. H. Anderson, 1981). To the best of my knowledge, no one
has directly compared the fits of additive and multiplicative
models of decision under risk to actual choices between pairs
of risky options rather than to valuation or rating of single
options. In sum, there does not seem to be strong empiri-
cal evidence for preferring multiplicative integration to addi-
tive integration in risky choices, though this is a controversial
statement.
Stewart and Simpson (2008) have extended the DbS
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model with a process account of the integration of infor-
mation. The extension is quite simple: People are assumed
to make a series of binary, ordinal comparisons between at-
tribute values in working memory. Frequency accumulators
tally the number of favourable comparisons for each option.
A choice is made when the difference in tallies exceeds a
threshold. For example, consider Choice 2 from Table 1.
The choice offers (a) a 20% chance of £4000 otherwise an
80% chance of £0 or (b) a 25% chance of £3,000 otherwise
a 75% chance of £0. The decision process is hypothesised to
proceed as follows:
1. A target attribute is randomly selected by selecting a
gamble, an attribute type, and an attribute at random. For
example, Prospect A might be selected (rather than Prospect
B), amounts might be selected (rather than probabilities), the
value £3000 might be selected (rather than £0).
2. A comparison attribute is randomly selected from the
decision sample. The decision sample will comprise both
attribute values from the immediate context (i.e., those listed
for Choice 2) and attribute values from long-term memory
(approximated by the distributions from Figure 3). Stewart
and Simpson (2008) assumed sampling from either source is
equally likely. Let’s say a value of £2000 (from long-term
memory) is sampled.
3. The target and comparison attribute values are com-
pared with a binary, ordinal comparison. In the current ex-
ample, the comparison is between a target value of £3000
and a comparison value of £2000. £3000 is good compared
to £2000, and thus the comparison is favourable.
4. If the comparison is favourable, the accumulator for the
target prospect is incremented by one count. In this way, the
accumulators tally the number of favourable binary, ordinal
comparisons.
5. If the difference between accumulator tallies for each
prospect reaches threshold, select the prospect with the high-
est accumulator. Otherwise, begin again at Step 1.
For a given option, a favourable comparison involving one
of its probabilities and a favourable comparison involving
one of its amounts both lead to an increment for the option’s
accumulator. Effectively then, information about risk and in-
formation about reward are combined additively. This addi-
tive combination is a break from the multiplicative combina-
tion in the EU-theory based models, but nonetheless provides
a good account of people’s risky choices.
The probability that the accumulator of a given option will
be incremented is related in a very straightforward way to the
original DbS model subjective values. For a given attribute
value, the probability of a favourable comparison is given by
the proportion of attribute values in working memory that are
less favourable. If one assumes that any attribute value of an
option is equally likely to be selected for comparison, then
the probability of an increment of the frequency accumulator
for that option is given by the average, across all of the op-
tion’s attribute values, of the proportion of less favourable at-
tribute values in working memory. In other words, the prob-
ability that an option’s accumulator is incremented is given
by the average subjective value of the option’s attributes.
A note about comparing probabilities is in order. Con-
sider the comparison between 80% in Prospect B and 25% in
Prospect A. Just because 80% is greater than 25% does not
mean the comparison is favourable. After all, an 80% chance
of nothing is clearly worse than a 25% chance of something.
Effectively, the valence of the corresponding outcome needs
to be considered when comparing probabilities. In the math-
ematics of the model, if the corresponding outcome is bad,
the accompanying probability is given a negative sign, so that
probabilities of bad things, no matter how large, are always
less favourable than the probabilities of good things, no mat-
ter how small. (This point will be important later on when
considering why DbS works.)
One strength of this process version of the DbS model is
that a closed form mathematical expression for the probabil-
ity of selecting either option can be formed. Because, in the
case of binary choice, one is incrementing either the accumu-
lator for one option or the accumulator for the other and be-
cause the choice rule is a difference threshold, the model can
be implemented using the mathematics of the random walk
(Feller, 1968). Thus there is no need to run simulations of
the model. It is sufficient to calculate the average proportion
of less favourable attribute values for a given option, and use
these as drift rates in the random walk. Specifically, the prob-
ability of choosing Prospect A is 1/(1 +(1− 1/d)T ) where
d is the relative probability of an increment for Prospect A
compared to Prospect B and T is the threshold. Alternatively
the drift rates can drive a race to a fixed, absolute thresh-
old, in which case the probability of choosing Prospect A is
∑T−1i=0 (T−i−1)!i!(T−1)! pAT pBi where pA is the probability of an incre-
ment for Prospect A and pB = 1− pA is the probability of an
increment for Prospect B. Stewart and Simpson (2008) found
that both implementations work well.
Stewart and Simpson (2008) have shown how the model
provides a good account of the choice proportions from the
original Kahneman and Tversky (1979) choices, including
the common-ratio and framing effects described earlier. Fig-
ure 7 reproduces Stewart and Simpson’s plot of the model’s
predictions of the choice proportions for each option. Each
point in the plot represents a choice. The y-axis gives the em-
pirical choice proportion for selecting (arbitrarily) the right-
hand option that Kahneman and Tversky found, and the x-
axis gives the DbS model prediction for the probability of
selecting the right option. There is good agreement between
the model predictions and the data (r2 = .87), and this is
mainly due to the model predicting the correct direction of
preference for each prospect (i.e., the points fall in either the
top-right or bottom-left quadrants).
In fitting this data, the DbS model did not have any free
parameters. Stewart and Simpson (2008) explore how ro-
bust these predictions are under alternative implementations
of the model (with a free parameter representing the proba-
bility of selecting amounts rather than probabilities for sam-
pling, with a free parameter representing the relative weight-
ing of the background distribution of attribute values and
the attribute values from the immediate context in the de-
cision sample, with uniform rather than skewed distributions
of attribute values, and with alternative thresholds or alter-
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Figure 7. Choice proportions from the Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) data set plotted against DbS predictions. Data point numbers
match Kahneman and Tversky’s numbering. Adapted from Stewart
and Simpson (2008).
native stopping rules). For a wide range of alternative pa-
rameter values, the model makes the same qualitative pre-
dictions, correctly predicting the direction of preference for
all 16 choices. This is important because it suggests that the
model is not performing well because it is too flexible: Stew-
art and Simpson (2008) were not just lucky in their assump-
tions about sampling, weightings of background and imme-
diate context, etc.
There is, in fact, a good a priori reason to expect the
DbS model to perform well. EU theory and its deriva-
tive models are, effectively, regression models. For exam-
ple, consider a n-outcome gamble of the form p1 chance
of x1, p2 chance of x2, ..., pn chance of xn. According to
these models, the subjective value of the gamble is given by
w(p1)U(x1)+w(p2)U(x2)+ ...+w(pn)U(xn). The w and U
functions transform probabilities and amounts, respectively,
into their subjective equivalents. The subjective probabilities
are effectively used as regression coefficients to weight the
utilities in arriving at an overall subjective value for the gam-
ble. Equivalently, because multiplication is commutative, the
utilities can be thought of as regression coefficients weight-
ing the subjective probabilities. (This unusual interpretation
comes into play below.) Dawes (1979) has shown how im-
proper linear models provide a very good approximation to
linear regression equations. In an improper linear model,
the magnitude of the regression coefficients is dropped and
only their sign is retained. For example, for the regression
equation 3x1 − 4x2 + 7x3 − 2x4, the improper counterpart is
+x1−x2 +x3−x4. Though the cognitive process in the DbS
model is not an improper linear regression equation—the
process is a random walk—the predictions of the model are
quite similar to those of an improper linear model. Because
of the way that DbS compares the probabilities of good and
bad things, probabilities are weighted with either +1 or −1
depending on the valence of the associated outcome. Thus,
as a regression equation, the subjective value of a gamble
(i.e., the probability of an increment to the associated accu-
mulator) is given by val(x1)Rp(p1) + val(x2)Rp(p2) + ... +
val(xn)Rp(pn)+Rx(x1)+Rx(x2)+ ...+Rx(xn) where val(xi)
is either +1 or -1 depending on the valence of xi, and Rp and
Rx are functions giving the proportion of attribute values in
the sample that are less favourable than the target attribute
value. The val(xi)Rp(pi) terms in the DbS model are the
improper version of the w(pi)U(xi) terms in the EU-based
models. Thus just as utilities act as regression coefficients
for subjective probabilities in the EU-based models, so the
valence of the amount acts as an improper regression coef-
ficient for the subjective probability in the DbS model. So,
because the EU-based models provide a good description of
people’s choices, to the extent that the improper approxima-
tion is good, the DbS model should also provide a good de-
scription of people’s choices.
Experimental Evidence
Thus far, I’ve described how, in DbS, the distribution of
attribute values in the environment combines with the use
of a limited set of cognitive tools to offer an account of
why the psychoeconomic functions inferred from our risky
decisions take the forms that they do. I’ve also reviewed
how DbS might be extended to predict risky choices and
how, on a preliminary test, this extension seems able to ac-
count for the now infamous violations of EU theory that were
used to motivate prospect theory. Of course, there are many
more important results in risky decision making that a com-
plete model must account for and this is work currently in
progress. I close this article with a review of some of the
experimental evidence that motivated the DbS model. In
each of the following sections the experimental data provide
a challenge to the notion that our subjective valuations of
outcomes and probabilities are stable. Instead, the data are
consistent with the DbS model, which predicts that subjec-
tive valuations will vary as the distribution of attribute values
in the immediate context changes.
Prospect Relativity
Birnbaum (1992) and Stewart, Chater, Stott, and Reimers
(2003) asked participants to select the certainty equivalent
for a prospect from a series of candidate values. The cer-
tainty equivalent for a risky prospect is the amount of money
available with certainty that is worth the same as the chance
to play the risky prospect. For example, £40 would be the
certainty equivalent for the gamble 50% chance of £100 if
people were indifferent between receiving £40 or playing
the 50% chance of £100 gamble. Birnbaum manipulated the
skew of the candidate certainty equivalents. When the candi-
date values were positively skewed (i.e., many small values)
the certainty equivalent selected was smaller than when the
candidate values were negatively skewed (i.e., many large
values). Stewart et al. manipulated the range of candidate
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certainty equivalents. When the range was high (i.e., all
certainty equivalents were large) the prospect was overval-
ued compared to when the range was low (i.e., all certainty
equivalents were small). Instead, participants were selecting
certainty equivalents in the middle of the range, irrespective
of the absolute value of the certainty equivalents and despite
that fact that failing to provide their true certainty equivalents
was costing them money. In sum, these experiments show
that the distribution of candidate certainty equivalents affects
their subjective valuation (see also Ariely, Koszegi, Mazar,
& Shampan’er, n.d.).
EU-based theories, in which a utility or value function
(e.g., Figure 1) is used to transform amounts into their sub-
jective equivalent, cannot account for this result: EU-based
theories assume that the transformation is stable, but these
data suggest that the utility of a candidate value varies de-
pending on the accompanying candidate values. And this is
just was DbS predicts: The subjective value of a certainty
equivalent is determined by binary, ordinal comparison with
the sample in working memory—which is likely to be full of
the suggested certainty equivalents. Thus a given certainty
equivalent will seem subjectively larger when there are many
smaller candidate certainty equivalents in the choice set. But
the same certainty equivalent will seem subjectively smaller
when there are many larger candidate certainty equivalents
in the choice set.
Stewart et al. (2003) conducted an accompanying choice
experiment showing that prospects are also valued relative to
one another. Participants were asked to select the prospect
they’d most like to play from a set where risk and reward
were traded off. In the High-Risk Condition one group of
participants chose from five relatively high-risk prospects:
{50% chance of £50, 55% chance of £45, 60% chance of
£40, 65% chance of £35, 70% chance of £30}. In the Low-
Risk Condition another group participants chose from a set
of relatively low-risk prospects: {75% chance of £25, 80%
chance of £20, 85% chance of £15, 90% chance of £10, 95%
chance of £5}. The high-risk prospects can be derived from
the low risk prospects by decreasing all of the probabilities
by a fixed value and increasing all of the amounts by a fixed
value. Because DbS assumes that attributes are valued by
comparing them to other attribute values in the choice set,
decreasing all of the probabilities by a fixed value or increas-
ing all of the amounts by a fixed value will not affect the sub-
jective values of the prospects. Thus DbS predicts a similar
pattern of preference in the two conditions, which is just what
Stewart et al. (2003) found. In contrast, according to EU
theory, the even distribution of preferences across the Low-
Risk Condition means that people generally have quite a low
risk preference and thus the lowest-risk option in the High-
Risk Condition should be really popular. Similarly, the even
distribution of preferences across the High-Risk Condition
means that people have quite a high risk preference and thus
the highest-risk option in the Low-Risk Condition should be
really popular. Thus EU theory cannot predict an even pat-
tern of preference in both conditions. These data suggest that
the subjective value of a prospect is derived relative to the set
of accompanying prospects. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and
Vlaev, Chater, and Stewart (2007a, 2007b) give a series of
real-world examples of prospect relativity.
The Attraction Effect
The attraction effect offers another example of how pref-
erence between risky prospects can be altered as the choice
set is manipulated. The attraction effect is extremely well
replicated across a wide variety of stimulus attributes (e.g.,
Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; Dhar & Glazer, 1996; Si-
monson, 1989), but here I concentrate on decision under
risk where Wedell (1991) has explored the effect in detail.
Wedell (1991) offered participants choices between a low-
probability-high-amount prospect and a high-probability-
low-amount prospect. In the example in Figure 8, partic-
ipants might choose between Prospect A (an 83% chance
of $12) and Prospect B (a 30% chance of $33). The third
gamble in the set is manipulated between choices. In each
case, the added prospect is clearly worse—offering a slightly
lower amount with a slightly lower probability—than one of
the original two prospects. In Figure 8 Prospect C (a 78%
chance of $10) is dominated by Prospect A, and Prospect D
(a 25% chance of $30) is dominated by Prospect B. In each
case, participants have a preference for the dominating op-
tion: When the choice set is {Prospect A, Prospect B, and
Prospect C} participants prefer Prospect A. When the choice
set is {Prospect A, Prospect B, and Prospect D} participants
prefer Prospect B. In sum, the manipulation of a dominated
option causes a preference reversal between Prospects A and
B. This results in a challenge to the classic account, in which
Prospects A and B are valued independently of one another
and independently of any other prospects (i.e., Prospects C
and D).
A DbS account of the basic attraction effect is quite
straightforward. Comparisons between the dominated op-
tion and the dominating option favour the dominating op-
tion for both probability and amount. But comparisons be-
tween the dominated option and the non-dominating option
favour the dominated option on one attribute and the non-
dominating option on the other attribute. Thus the probabil-
ity of a favourable comparison is raised more for the dom-
inating option. The DbS account is essentially the same as
the account offered by other models in which the effect re-
sults from the dominated alternative altering the subjective
values of the other two options (e.g., range-frequency theory,
described later).
Wedell (1991) provided further detailed results by manip-
ulating the location of the dominating option (see also Huber
et al., 1982; Dhar & Glazer, 1996). Some of this evidence
appears problematic for value-shifting accounts including the
DbS account above, so conclusions about the adequacy of the
DbS explanation must await further work.
Probability Judgements, Working Memory, and
Context Effects in Probability Judgement
DbS predicts a close link between judgement and work-
ing memory. Working memory capacity reflects the quan-
tity of information that can be held in mind whilst com-
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Figure 8. Some options used by Wedell (1991) to demonstrate the
attraction effect.
pleting other cognitive processes (Engle, Tuholski, Laugh-
lin, & Conway, 1999, cf. passive short-term memory capac-
ity). Dougherty and Hunter (2003a, 2003b) and Sprenger and
Dougherty (2006) find that probability judgements are over-
estimated more by individuals with lower working-memory
capacities. The explanation is that lower working memory
capacity means that fewer alternative hypotheses can consid-
ered, and thus the target hypothesis is judged more likely.
Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, and Harbison (2008) give a
review and a mathematical model; here, this finding is taken
as evidence that event probabilities are compared to a sample
of alternative event probabilities taken from memory.
There is also evidence that the distribution of the event
probabilities in working memory affects these judgements.
Windschitl and Chambers (2004) found that adding an ex-
tremely unlikely alternative to the set of events increases
judgements of the probability of the target event. For ex-
ample, when told that one of the cities Calcutta, Cincin-
nati, Nairobi, or Moscow lies below the equator and asked
to judge subsequently the probability that Nairobi is below
the equator, including Cincinnati and Moscow (which are
extremely unlikely to lie below the equator) increases judge-
ments. Windschitl and Chambers explain these data using a
contrast mechanism, in which the probability for Nairobi is
inflated because the probabilities for Moscow and Cincinnati
are so small.
Even more direct evidence comes from Windschitl and
Wells (1998). Windschitl and Wells asked participants to
judge the likelihood that they would win a lottery if they
held a given number of tickets. Subjective judgements were
affected by the distribution of tickets among other players.
For example, holding 21 tickets was judged more favourably
when other players held 15, 14, 13, 13, and 12 tickets than
when other players held 52, 6, 2, 2, and 5 tickets. (Control
conditions address the possibility that judgements differed
because people failed to sum the total number of other tickets
correctly.) Windschitl and Wells attribute these effects to a
contrast mechanism, and DbS is just this type of mechanism.
In DbS, comparing 21 to every item in the first set results in
five favourable comparisons. But comparing 21 to every item
in the second set results in only four favourable comparisons.
Thus the subjective probability associated with 21 is higher
in the first set. In summary, for probability judgement, there
is good evidence for the comparisons with a sample of event
probabilities in working memory.
Salary Satisfaction
How happy you are with your salary does not just de-
pend on how much you earn. It depends on how much
you earn compared to your peers. Brown, Gardner, Oswald,
and Qian (2008) examined the relationship between reported
salary satisfaction and the distributions of salaries experi-
enced. Brown et al. used a large data set completed by a sam-
ple of employees from a sample of UK companies. Because
many employees in each of many companies were sampled,
it was possible to investigate the effects of the distribution of
salaries within a given employee’s company had on the em-
ployee’s satisfaction. In a regression analysis, after removing
the effects of absolute salary, Brown et al. found a significant
effect of (a) the rank of the employee’s salary within the com-
pany and (b) the position of the employee’s salary relative
to the minimum and maximum salaries in the company. In
summary, judgements of satisfaction with salary are higher if
it is among the highest in the company, independently on the
absolute level of the salary. And, in further analysis, Brown
et al. found that quit rates were higher in companies where
salary distributions were more positively skewed (i.e., many
small salaries, few large salaries). Thus not only ratings of
satisfaction but actual decisions to quit one’s job depend on
the distribution of salaries: A given salary does not map to a
specific utility; instead, the utility of a given salary depends
on how it compares to the other salaries one thinks about.
Revealed Psychoeconomic Functions
As I’ve reviewed above, the utility and subjective proba-
bility functions from EU theory and prospect theory are de-
scriptive: They take the forms they do because they describe
the risky choices we make. Typically, we infer the shapes
of these functions by fitting models with free parameters to
choice data (e.g., Gonzalez & Wu, 1999). It is even pos-
sible to discriminate between different candidate functional
forms for utility and subjective probability functions using
this technique (Stott, 2006).
But, according to DbS, the functions that are revealed will
depend upon the distribution of attribute values that people
encounter. Although it is not possible to manipulate exper-
imentally the background distributions that people experi-
ence in their everyday lives, it is possible to manipulate the
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distribution of attribute values that people experience in the
laboratory when they are making the choices that will be
used to infer their psychoeconomic functions. Stewart and
Reimers (2008b) have done just this. In their experiment,
participants made a series of choices between prospects. The
prospects were created by crossing the probabilities .2, .4,
.6., .8 and 1.0 with a set of amounts. The set of amounts
was manipulated between participants and was either posi-
tively skewed {£10, £20, £50, £100, £200, £500} or nega-
tively skewed {£10, £310, £410, £460, £490, £500}. The
negatively skewed set is the mirror image of the positively
skewed set.
To reveal the utility functions, Stewart and Reimers
(2008b) fitted EU theory to the data. Rather than fitting a
specific functional form for the utility function, they left the
utility of each monetary amount as a free parameter. Fig-
ure 9 shows the best fitting (non-parametric) utility functions
for the positively skewed and negatively skewed conditions.
The most striking result is that the manipulation of the dis-
tribution of amounts people experienced produces quite dif-
ferent utility functions. The dashed lines illustrate the DbS
predictions if the utility of each monetary amount was given
by the proportion of smaller amounts in the set of amounts
used in the experiment. For the positive skewed condition,
the data match these predictions quite closely. For the neg-
atively skewed condition, the utility function is more lin-
ear than the prediction. This actually makes sense if one
assumes that the sample of amounts in working memory
is a mixture of attributes from long-term memory and at-
tributes from the immediate context as DbS assumes. The
distribution in long-term memory is positively skewed (as
expected if the distribution in memory represents the real-
world distribution, Stewart et al., 2006). So, in the positively
skewed condition, the overall decision sample should be pos-
itively skewed because both the long-term-memory and the
immediate-context distributions are positively skewed. But
in the negatively skewed condition, the overall decision sam-
ple should be a mixture of the positively-skewed long-term-
memory distribution and the negatively-skewed immediate-
context distribution—and together this mixture should be
closer to uniformly distributed which would in turn predict
a more linear utility function.
In summary, experimentally manipulating the distribution
of attribute values produces differences in the revealed util-
ity functions. This finding is problematic for the notion that
utility functions are stable psychological entities. In the tra-
ditional view, in a given situation, the utility of each outcome
is looked up and then the option with the higher EU is cho-
sen. To accommodate Stewart and Reimers’s (2008b) data
within this framework, the best scenario is one in which the
functions are assumed to vary from context to context. But
then a theory of how the functions vary with experimental
context in needed to provide explanatory power. However,
these results follow naturally from DbS. But the distribution
of attribute values in working memory will vary over time—
because of both stochasticity in sampling and differences in
the immediate distribution of attribute values—the subjective
value of a given attribute will vary from context to context
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Figure 9. Revealed utility functions adapted from Stewart and
Reimers (2008b). Solid lines represent data and dashed lines rep-
resent DbS predictions (with only immediate attribute values in the
decision sample).
and time to time.
Preference Reversals Induced by Attribute Distri-
bution Differences
As I described when I reviewed the common-ratio and
framing effects above, preference reversals are particularly
important in the decision-making literature. Stewart and
Reimers (2008a) manipulated the distribution of attribute
values in the immediate context to create a preference re-
versal in a critical choice. The critical choice was be-
tween a 30% chance of 100 ipoints and a 40% chance of 75
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ipoints.3 To set the context, this critical choice was preceded
by eight choices in which the distribution of attribute values
was manipulated between participants. In the Probabilities-
Together-Amounts-Apart Condition, the probabilities 10%,
20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, and 60% were crossed with amounts
75 ipoints, 80 ipoints, 85 ipoints, 90 ipoints, 95 ipoints,
and 100 ipoints to create a set of prospects (100 ipoints
are worth about £1). In the Probabilities-Apart-Amounts-
Together Condition, the probabilities 30%, 32% , 34%, 36%,
38%, and 40% were crossed with the amounts 25 ipoints, 50
ipoints, 75 ipoints, 100 ipoints, 125 ipoints, and 150 ipoints.
The distribution of attributes in the Probabilities-
Together-Amounts-Apart Condition was selected to make
the difference between the 30% and 40% in the critical
choice appear small (with probabilities ranking 3rd and 4th
in the distribution) while the difference between the 75
ipoints and 100 ipoints was made to appear large (with
amounts ranking 1st and 6th in the distribution). Thus, be-
cause the difference in amounts is subjectively much larger
than the difference in probabilities, people should select on
the basis of amount and choose the 30% chance of 100
ipoints. The Probabilities-Apart-Amounts-Together Condi-
tion reversed this manipulation, with probabilities ranking
1st and 6th whilst amounts ranked 3rd and 4th. In this con-
dition, people should select on the basis of probability and
select the 40% chance of 75 ipoints.
Figure 10 shows how the proportion of people select-
ing each option in the critical choice varied by condition in
just this way. The switch from a majority preference for
a 30% chance of 100 ipoints in the Probabilities-Together-
Amounts-Apart condition to a majority preference for a 40%
chance of 75 ipoints in the Probabilities-Apart-Amounts-
Together Condition represents an attribute-distribution in-
duced preference reversal. Again, the conclusion is that we
do not have stable underlying psychoeconomic functions.
The best case interpretation for the classical view is that these
functions are malleable and vary from context to context, but
to go beyond the merely descriptive, one needs a theory to
explain why these functions vary from context to context.
DbS provides an account of this sort - by abandoning stable
psychoeconomic functions and instead assuming that subjec-
tive values are constructed afresh for each preference using
simple cognitive tools.
Discussion
In the review, I have presented evidence that the subjective
value of a given risky option is not derived independently of
the other options on offer. DbS offers one account of why
this might be the case. Because the decision sample con-
tains attributes from the immediate context, the subjective
value of each attribute value will vary from context to con-
text as the contents of the decision sample varies from con-
text to context. In this way, DbS makes reference to three
significant bodies of work: Parducci’s range-frequency the-
ory, Poulton’s response-contraction explanation of prospect
theory, and Payne, Bettman, Johnson, Slovic and Luce’s
construction-of-preference concept.
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Figure 10. A preference reversal for the choice 30% chance of 100
or 40% chance of 75 ipoints Stewart and Reimers (2008b).
Range-Frequency Theory. Range-frequency theory (Par-
ducci, 1965, 1995) is a theory of category judgement. In
category judgement tasks, stimuli varying along a single di-
mension are assigned one label from an ordered set of cate-
gories (e.g., lines varying in their length might be assigned
to categories “very short”, “short”, “medium”, “long”, “very
long”). Originally, the theory was used to account for the
effect of the distribution of perceptual stimuli on category
judgements. For example, a given target line length is rated
as larger in a positively skewed distribution of line lengths
(i.e., many smaller lines) than in a negatively skewed dis-
tribution of line lengths (i.e., many larger lines). Range-
frequency theory has been applied very widely beyond the
categorisation of perceptual stimuli (see Parducci, 1995, for
a review).4
Range-frequency theory has two components. The range
principle states that the stimulus range is divided into equal
size categories (one for each category label) irrespective of
the distribution of stimuli. The frequency principle states that
the stimulus range is divided into categories so that each cate-
gory is used equally frequently and contains an equal number
of stimuli. Thus the division of the stimulus range under the
frequency principle is completely dependent on the distribu-
tion of stimuli. For example, if line lengths are positively
skewed, then the smaller lengths will be divided into many
categories and the larger lengths into fewer categories. Ef-
fectively, under the frequency principle, the category label
assigned to a particular stimulus is determined by the stimu-
lus’s rank position. The overall category assigned to a given
3 ipoints is an online reward scheme. ipoints can be redeemed
for a large range of goods.
4 Adaptation level theory (Helson, 1964) represents perhaps the
first attempt to account for contextual effects. In adaptation level
theory, stimuli are judged against the mean of the distribution in
which they are encountered. Range-frequency theory goes further
in accounting for the effects of higher moments, like the variance
and the skew.
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stimulus is a weighted average of the categories given by the
range and frequency principles.
DbS makes very similar predictions, but the theoretical
account is quite different, offering a process rather than a
description. Recall that the subjective value of an attribute is
constructed from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons with
attributes in the decision sample. The long-term memory
contribution to the decision sample provides a component of
the subjective value that is independent of the distribution
of attribute values in the immediate context (cf. the range
principle). The immediate context’s contribution to the deci-
sion sample provides a component of subjective value that is
dependent on the rank position of the target attribute value in
the immediate context distribution (cf. the frequency princi-
ple). So although theoretical motivations are very different—
equal division of the stimulus range and equal use of cate-
gories in range-frequency theory and construction of a sub-
jective value via a series of binary, ordinal comparisons in
DbS—the net effect is very similar. DbS goes beyond range-
frequency theory in predicting that psychoeconomic func-
tions emerge from the real-world distribution of attribute val-
ues and in providing mechanism for integrating information
across attributes.
Response Contraction
Poulton (1994) offers an account of prospect theory in
terms of response contraction. Response contraction is a
bias of quantifying judgements in which responses are as-
similated towards a reference point on the scale, often the
midpoint of the scale (Poulton, 1989). Such a contraction
provides a natural account of Kahneman and Tversky’s prob-
ability weighting function in which small probabilities are
overweighted as they are assimilated towards the centre of
the scale and large probabilities are underweighted as they
too are assimilated towards the centre of the scale. Simi-
larly for gains and losses, although response contraction does
not offer an account of the curvature of the value function, it
does predict that large gains and large losses will be under-
weighted as they are assimilated towards the centre of the
scale.
Poulton’s (1994) response contraction explanation of
these effects differs from the DbS account. Under DbS,
the revealed psychoeconomic functions take the forms they
do because of the distribution of attribute values people en-
counter. But at a more general level there is a common
thread. DbS was derived from my work on contextual ef-
fects perceptual identification and categorisation (e.g., Stew-
art, Brown, & Chater, 2002; Stewart & Brown, 2004; Stewart
et al., 2005; Stewart & Morin, 2007) and from classic studies
in psychophysics (e.g., Garner, 1954). The hypothesis is that
our representations of economic quantities like money, risk,
and delay are similar in quality to our representation of per-
ceptual quantities like loudness or brightness. In this respect,
the argument follows Poulton’s general argument that biases
in judgement and decision making have the same causes as
biases in other judgements. I have tried to go further in offer-
ing ideas about the common cognitive mechanisms responsi-
ble for the common biases.
The Construction of Preference
In DbS, the psychoeconomic functions do not actually
have a psychological reality. That is, the functions are not
internal to the individual, and carried about with them ready
to apply to each new decision they make. So under DbS
the psychoeconomic functions can be considered as revealed
from or descriptive of the choices that people make given the
real-world distribution of attribute values. But these func-
tions do not describe the psychological processes that under-
lie them. That is, people do not simply use these functions
to “look up” the psychological value of a given gain, loss, or
probability. Instead, the psychological process is a series of
binary, ordinal comparisons with a sample of attribute values
and the subjective value is the endpoint of an accumulation
of favourable comparisons. Further, the subjective value will
vary as a function of the real-world distribution of attribute
values and as a result of stochasticity in sampling of these
values. In this respect, DbS makes a connection with the lit-
erature on the construction of preference (cf. Bettman, Luce,
& Payne, 1998; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992; Slovic,
1995)—the notion that our preferences are not stable but are
derived afresh for each new decision.
Conclusion
I have argued that the decisions that we make are the result
of our use of a set of domain-general cognitive tools. In the
absence of stable functions relating risks and rewards to their
subjective equivalents, we value risks or rewards by compar-
ing them with samples of risks and rewards from memory.
And because our memories are adapted to represent the envi-
ronment, the memory samples reflect the real-world distribu-
tions of attribute values that we encounter. Psychoeconomic
functions describing our valuation of risks and rewards can
be derived from the distribution of attribute values we en-
counter in the real world, though these functions do not them-
selves describe the psychological processes underlying their
derivation.
Risks and rewards are valued by the same binary, ordinal
comparison mechanism because, without formal training, we
do not have any other method for assessing the importance
of these numbers. So, although probabilities and amounts
should be treated differently in a normative account, they are
processed in the same way as one another (and other psy-
choeconomic attributes) in this psychological account.
A key test of the DbS hypothesis is that experimental ma-
nipulation of the distributions of attribute values should have
a strong effect on the decisions that we make. I have pre-
sented evidence that manipulating the distribution does in-
deed have this effect. Though some have argued that these
effects should be explained away, averaged over, or carefully
counterbalanced out, I think they indicate the true base for
decision under risk. My conclusion is that decision is not by
“look up”; decision is by sampling.
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